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Abstract—Typosquatting is the act of purposefully registering
a domain name that is a mistype of a popular domain name.
It is a concept that has been known and studied for over 15
years, yet still thoroughly practiced up until this day. While
previous typosquatting studies have always taken a snapshot of
the typosquatting landscape or base their longitudinal results
only on domain registration data, we present the first content-
based, longitudinal study of typosquatting. We collected data
about the typosquatting domains of the 500 most popular sites of
the Internet every day, for a period of seven months, and we use
this data to establish whether previously discovered typosquatting
trends still hold today, and to provide new results and insights
in the typosquatting landscape. In particular we reveal that,
even though 95% of the popular domains we investigated are
actively targeted by typosquatters, only few trademark owners
protect themselves against this practice by proactively registering
their own typosquatting domains. We take advantage of the
longitudinal aspect of our study to show, among other results,
that typosquatting domains change hands from typosquatters
to legitimate owners and vice versa, and that typosquatters
vary their monetization strategy by hosting different types of
pages over time. Our study also reveals that a large fraction of
typosquatting domains can be traced back to a small group of
typosquatting page hosters and that certain top-level domains are
much more prone to typosquatting than others.
I. INTRODUCTION
Domain names and the underlying domain name resolution
protocol are arguably one of the linchpin technologies that have
allowed the modern web to expand to its current dimensions.
Even though users increasingly rely on search engines to
find interesting and relevant content, domain names are as
important as ever. This is exemplified by ICANN’s constant
rollout of hundreds of new Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such
as .xxx, .guru, and .email, which were created to allow
institutes and individuals to obtain relevant domain names that
are long unavailable in the overcrowded traditional TLDs.
The importance of domain names has not gone by un-
noticed by unscrupulous individuals who wish to profit at
the expense of others. In the nineties, some people started
registering domain names including trademarks and brand
names not belonging to them, with the hope of later selling
them to their rightful owners at a higher price. This practice
was named domain squatting and many variations of this type
of attack have emerged over the years, with perhaps the most
popular and exploited type being typosquatting.
In typosquatting, an attacker abuses the fact that real
human users may mistype a URL while typing it in their
browser’s address bar or email client. As such, a typosquatter
can register vacebook.com and capture the traffic of users
who mistype facebook.com and would otherwise receive
an error in their browsers. As a matter of fact, in May 2013,
Facebook was awarded 2.8 million dollars in damages caused
by typosquatting, as well as over 100 typosquatting domains
that were registered and monetized by typosquatters [22].
The prevalence of typosquatting has attracted the attention
of multiple researchers who attempted to map the typosquat-
ting landscape, identify the domains that are targeted the
most, and discover the preferred monetization strategies of
typosquatters [2], [8], [16], [23], [25]. What these studies
have in common, is that they either characterize a snapshot of
typosquatting activity through a single crawling effort over a
limited period of time, or limit the longitudinal aspect of their
study to domain registration data only, without investigating
changes in the domains’ content.
In this paper, we present the first content-based typosquat-
ting experiment that studies the typosquatting phenomenon
longitudinally, i.e., in time. Instead of reporting on a single
snapshot of the typosquatting landscape, we performed a
seven-month-long experiment in which we visited the ty-
posquatting domains targeting the 500 most popular sites of
the Internet every day. Through the collection of more than
900 GB of typosquatting data, our study allows us not only to
measure typosquatting at a large scale but also to investigate
the changes of typosquatting domains over time, allowing us
to answer questions that could not be answered with a single
snapshot of typosquatting activity.
Among other results, we find that, even though 95% of
the most popular domains on the Internet are targeted by
typosquatters, most of them do not use defensive registrations
as a means of protecting their identity and their clients. We also
find that a large fraction of all possible typosquatting domains
for short popular authoritative domains is already registered,
and that typosquatters are hence increasingly targeting longer
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domains. Making use of the longitudinal aspect of our study,
we discover that typosquatters are actively switching between
monetization strategies for the domains that they own, and
are also on the look-out for expiring registrations of popular
domain names. We also show that 50% of all typosquatting
domains can be traced back to just four typosquatting page
hosters. Finally, on the policy-side, we observe that differences
in domain price setting and the availability of out-of-court
domain dispute resolution procedures between different TLDs,
have a significant effect on the prevalence of typosquatting.
Our main contributions are:
• We report on the first content-based longitudinal study
of typosquatting abuse, consisting of over 900 GB of
data gathered over a period of seven months.
• We verify whether previously discovered typosquat-
ting trends still hold today.
• We provide new results and insights in the typosquat-
ting landscape, based on both the static and longitu-
dinal aspects of our data.
• We show that the adoption of strict policies and
easy dispute-resolution procedures from registries, can
decrease typosquatting abuse.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we provide background information on typosquatting
in general and on the way our data gathering experiment
was set up. Section III describes the main results found by
our experiment. Section IV describes related work and finally
Section V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Typosquatting Models
The most frequently occurring domain name typos are
those that have a Damerau-Levenshtein distance of one from
a popular domain name [3], i.e., domain names resulting
from a single character insertion, deletion, substitution or
adjacent character permutation from a popular domain. When
the inserted or substituted character is adjacent to the original
character on a QWERTY keyboard, we say the typosquat-
ting domain also has a “fat-finger distance” of one [16]. In
2006, Wang et al. categorized typosquatting domains into five
different categories [25]. Based on those categories and as-
suming the authoritative domain example.com and intended
URL www.example.com, we consider the following five
typosquatting models for our study:
1) Missing-dot typos: The dot following “www” is
forgotten, e.g., wwwexample.com
2) Character-omission typos: One character is omitted,
e.g., www.exmple.com
3) Character-permutation typos: Consecutive charac-
ters are swapped, e.g., www.examlpe.com
4) Character-substitution typos: Characters are re-
placed by their adjacent ones, given a specific key-
board layout, e.g., www.ezample.com where “x”
was replaced by the QWERTY-adjacent “z”.
5) Character-duplication typos: Characters are mistak-
enly typed twice, e.g., www.exaample.com
While one can likely come up with more ways of including
typos in a domain name, e.g., a wrong domain TLD, in this
work, we limit ourselves to the typosquatting domains that
can be generated following the aforementioned typo models.
We also limit ourselves to domains resulting from a single
application of one of these models, since those are more likely
to be typed by a user than domains containing multiple typos.
B. Data Gathering
To gather the data required for our longitudinal study, we
set up two automated crawlers, which where supplied with
the Alexa top 500 domains of April 1, 2013 as input. The
first crawler generates the typosquatting domains for each
authoritative domain in the input, according to the aforemen-
tioned models. For each authoritative and generated domain,
the crawler first determines whether the domain resolves to an
IP address. If so, the crawler visits the web page hosted on the
domain using PhantomJS1, a headless JavaScript-enabled web
browser. After loading the web page, the crawler waits for 10
seconds, allowing the page to load dynamic content or perform
a redirect. Finally, the crawler saves the IP address, final URL,
HTML body and a screenshot of the page to disk. The crawler
was configured to process the entire list of domains daily, for a
period of 7 months starting at April 1, 2013 and running until
October 31, 2013. The crawl was duplicated onto a second
machine to provide redundancy in case of system failure. In
order to prevent excessive resource usage and to minimize
the chance of our crawlers being blocked by typosquatting
domains, duplicate typosquatting domains were filtered out
and the rate at which the crawlers visit domains was set to the
minimum value that still allows a crawl to finish within a small
margin of 24 hours. In total, 28,179 potential typosquatting
domains were generated, out of which 17,172 resolved to an
IP address at least once during our study.
The second crawler was configured to perform a WHOIS
lookup for every domain ever successfully resolved by the
HTTP crawler. The WHOIS responses (if any) were parsed
using Ruby Whois2 and then saved to disk. The crawler was
configured to process all domains once per week, over the same
time period as the HTTP crawler. The slower one-week crawl
interval was needed to respect the acceptable use policies of
the queried WHOIS servers.
One irregularity that occurred during our data gathering
period is that the crawl rate of our crawlers had to be increased
during the week of August 21, to accommodate for a planned
power interruption of our crawling machines on August 27
and 28. The possible effects of this irregularity are discussed
in Section III-B.
C. Analysis
Our crawlers collected over 900 GB worth of data during
the data gathering period, consisting of 3,389,137 web pages
and 424,278 distinct WHOIS records. In order to analyze
this data, we classified the collected pages into the categories
listed in Table I. The third column of this table indicates for
each category whether we consider it a legitimate, malicious
or undetermined use of a domain name. Although most of
1http://phantomjs.org/
2http://ruby-whois.org/
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the malicious categories are actually in a legal gray area, we
mark them as malicious because these practices are set up to
deceptively extract profit from users’ mistypings.
As a first step towards classifying the collected pages
into the selected categories, we tried to automatically divide
the pages into clusters. Since some types of typosquatting
pages (such as generic ad parking pages) are likely to target
many different authoritative domains, we decided to cluster
the pages based on visual appearance rather than domain-
specific properties such as the page’s domain name or the
corresponding authoritative domain. To measure the visual
appearance of a page, we used the concatenation of a per-
ceptual hash of the page’s screenshot and a locality-sensitive
hash of its HTML body. The perceptual hash of an image is
a fixed-length bit vector that represents a fingerprint of that
image. Unlike cryptographic hashes, which give a drastically
different output for small changes in the input, perceptual
hash functions are designed to produce similar outputs for
similar inputs. A locality-sensitive hash is based on the same
principle, but works on textual data instead of multimedia
files. These hashes allow us to programmatically compare the
screenshots and HTML bodies of the collected pages, in order
to group them into clusters of similar pages. The concrete
perceptual and locality-sensitive hash algorithms we used are
the aHash3 and the Nilsimsa4 algorithm respectively, which
were selected based on an evaluation of their performance on
a small subset of the dataset that was clustered manually. Using
these hash functions and a custom clustering algorithm based
on fastcluster [17], the 3,389,137 collected web pages were
automatically grouped into 8,102 clusters.
After this initial clustering, we spent approximately two
and a half man-months performing an extensive manual anal-
ysis of the data. The goals of this manual analysis were
twofold: i) to improve the automatic visual clustering results,
and ii) to categorize the clusters into the categories of Table I.
In order to assign the appropriate category to each page,
clusters of visually similar pages were, in many cases, split
up into smaller clusters. For instance, the cluster of pages
looking like amazon.com was split up into sub-clusters for
authoritative pages, affiliate abuse pages and ad parking pages.
To facilitate the manual analysis, we developed a custom web
application that presents all of the collected data, i.e., the
screenshots, WHOIS records, IP addresses and final URLs
of the visited web pages, in a structured way. Ultimately,
40% of all clusters were classified, representing 95% of all
collected pages. Because of this second-phase manual analysis,
we have high confidence in the quality and accuracy of our
data. Our dataset has been made available for download at
https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/typos15/.
D. Types of Abuse
In this section we briefly describe the non-self-explanatory
categories listed in Table I.
1) Affiliate abuse: We consider a page to be performing
affiliate abuse when it redirects its visitors to a legitimate
website, taking advantage of an affiliate program offered by
that legitimate site. Affiliate programs are arrangements in
3https://github.com/JohannesBuchner/imagehash
4http://ixazon.dynip.com/∼cmeclax/nilsimsa.html
which a website owner (the advertiser) pays a commission to a
third party (the affiliate) for sending traffic to her website. For
instance, amazon.com pays a commission for every purchase
made by visitors coming from websites participating in their
affiliate program. To identify what traffic comes from which
affiliate, each affiliate is assigned a unique identifier that she
should specify in the URLs toward which she forwards her
visitors. Sometimes an intermediate company sits in between
the advertiser and the affiliate to handle the technical issues
of organizing an affiliate program and to make it easier for
advertisers and affiliates to find each other. Most affiliate
programs have strict conditions that limit the ways in which
affiliates are allowed to bring traffic to the advertiser’s website.
Banners and hyperlinks to the advertiser’s site are allowed, but
automatic forwarding typically is not. For instance, Amazon
explicitly disallows automatic forwarding.
An example of affiliate abuse by typosquatting that is
active at the time of this writing, is the following: users who
mistype match.com as ma5ch.com (“t” substituted by the
QWERTY-adjacent “5”) are eventually brought back to the
match.com domain, but the typosquatting page appends an
affiliate identifier to the URL when it redirects the user’s
browser from the typosquatting domain to the authoritative
one. As such, the owners of the authoritative domain will now
have to pay an affiliate commission to the typosquatter, for a
visit that should have been theirs in the first place.
Identifying affiliate abuse is not always easy. In particular,
a naive analysis cannot differentiate affiliate abuse from so-
called defensive registrations, which are typosquatting domains
proactively registered by an authoritative domain owner, to
prevent abuse from typosquatters. Both types of domains
forward their visitors to the authoritative domain, typically
adding an identifying parameter to the forwarding URL. In
the case of affiliate abuse, this parameter is used to identify
the affiliate, while in the case of defensive registrations it is
typically used to identify the forwarding domain (for traffic
analysis purposes). Because of this similarity, we did not
attempt to automatically identify affiliate abuse, relying on our
second-phase manual analysis for this instead. For this manual
analysis, we took into account several factors to identify
affiliate abuse, including (1) the names of parameters added
to the forwarding URL, (2) the values of these parameters,
(3) whether the authoritative site advertises the fact that it
has an affiliate program, and (4) the WHOIS records of the
authoritative and typosquatting domains. We did not attempt
to distinguish between typosquatting pages abusing an affiliate
program of their own authoritative domain or an affiliate
program of other unrelated domains, e.g., a typosquatting
domain of target.com redirecting the user to the affiliate
program of amazon.com.
2) Scam: A scam page is a page that tries to trick users
into performing an action that is undesirable for the user
and profitable for the attacker. Two popular types of scams
are “surveys” and malicious advertisements (malvertising). In
surveys, users are asked to perform a series of steps in return
for some reward, for example a $100 coupon for a big box
store. The steps almost always involve users entering their
email address, name, phone number and potentially physical
address. These details can then be used to subscribe users to
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TABLE I. THE COLLECTED TYPOSQUATTING PAGES WERE CLASSIFIED INTO CATEGORIES, BASED ON THE MOST LIKELY INTENT OF THE PAGE. THE
THIRD COLUMN INDICATES THE CATEGORY TYPE: L STANDS FOR LEGITIMATE, M STANDS FOR MALICIOUS AND U STANDS FOR UNDETERMINED.
Category Description T
Authoritative Pages redirecting to or displaying the authoritative domain without any abuse L
Coinciding Pages containing legitimate content that happen to reside on a typosquatting variant of an authoritative domain L
Protected Pages notifying the user that she made a typo and/or link to the authoritative domain L
Ad parking Pages that have no content other than showing advertisements M
Adult content Pages showing adult/pornographic content M
Affiliate abuse Pages taking advantage of an affiliate program offered by another domain (see Section II-D1) M
For sale Pages that have no content other than being advertised as for sale M
Hit stealing Pages redirecting to a legitimate domain without abusing an affiliate program M
Scam Pages persuading the user to enter personal information or to download malware (see Section II-D2) M
No content Pages that have no content (e.g., blank pages or pages under construction) U
Server error Pages displaying an error, which was caused by a server-side problem U
Crawl error Pages for which the crawler failed or that explicitly block the crawler’s IP address U
Other Unclassified pages and pages that do not fall into any of the above categories U
Fig. 1. A scam page trying to trick users mistyping youtube.com into
downloading malware.
spam lists, expensive mobile services, and even potentially sold
to larger data aggregators.
In malvertising, the scam page is trying to convince the
user to willingly download and execute a malicious program.
Fig. 1 shows the ad we got when purposefully mistyping
youtube.com as outube.com. If the user downloads and
installs the purported software update, she will be infected with
malware (11/51 virus engines at virustotal.com identified the
downloaded executable as malicious).
III. RESULTS
A. Malicious vs. Defensive Registrations
Our data indicates that typosquatting is still very prevalent
for the list of authoritative domains we considered. Out of these
500 domains, 477 have at least one malicious typosquatting
domain. We considered a domain to be malicious when it
is classified as such for at least 7 days during the data
gathering period. These numbers indicates that on the attack
side, typosquatters have no trouble registering and exploiting
typosquatting domains, despite long-standing anticybersquat-
ting legislation [1].
On the defense side, trademark owners can protect them-
selves against typosquatting by proactively making defensive
typosquatting domain registrations whenever they register an
authoritative domain. Many registrars provide a service to
automatically register a wide range of possible cybersquatting
domain names when a trademark owner wants to register
a domain. Nevertheless, our data shows that only 156 of
the authoritative domains in our list have defensive domain
registrations, meaning that 344 domains (representing 68.8%
of the 500 most popular sites of the Internet) have no defensive
registrations whatsoever. Thus, anyone who makes a typo for
these domains and does not receive an error, is sure to land
on a malicious typosquatting page.
The top 3 of authoritative domains with the most defen-
sive registrations consists of huffingtonpost.com with
57 defensive domains, americanexpress.com with 42
domains and bloomberg.com with 39 domains. The top 3
of authoritative domains with the most malicious typosquat-
ting domains are adultfriendfinder.com with 132
typosquatting domains, constantcontact.com with 103
typosquatting domains and odnoklassniki.ru with 97
such domains. Alarmingly, out of the three banks in our
top 500 list (bankofamerica.com, hdfcbank.com and
icicibank.com), only bankofamerica.com has defen-
sive registrations. This means that if a user enters a typo
for the domain of one of the two other banks, she could
easily land on a phishing page, thinking she entered the
proper domain name of her bank. Although we did not
encounter any phishing pages for these banks during our
study, our data shows hdfcbank.com had 42 active mali-
cious typosquatting domains, icicibank.com had 43, and
bankofamerica.com had 46. Any of these domains could
start hosting phishing pages at any time or redirect users to
the websites of competing financial institutes.
It is surprising to see that, in a time where companies
are estimated to spend 7% of their information technology
budgets on security, and global cyber crime costs are estimated
between $300 billion and $1 trillion [15], many companies do
not bother to make any defensive registrations at all for their
domains. In particular, one would expect the financial sector
to take a leading role in protecting their reputation and their
customers. It seems these companies are either not aware of
the problem, or simply do not care about it. The fact that large
Internet companies such as Microsoft [21] and Facebook [22]
are successfully contending with cybersquatters through defen-
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sive domain registrations and legal actions, demonstrates that
the problem is real and should not be ignored.
B. Daily Typosquatting Domain Count
Taking the Alexa top 500 domains as input, our HTTP
crawler generated 28,179 potential typosquatting domains,
based on the models discussed in Section II-A. From those po-
tential typosquatting domains, 17,172 domains (61%) at least
once during our data gathering period resolved to an IP address
that was hosting a web page. From those active typosquatting
domains, 13,526 domains (79%) were hosting malicious con-
tent for at least one day. Fig. 2 illustrates the daily growth
in the number of discovered domains. The crossed-out line
shows the total number of malicious typosquatting domains
discovered up until a certain date. Since this is a cumulative
measure, this line is strictly increasing. The figure shows an
increase from about 11,000 domains at the start of the period
to 13,526 domains at the end, indicating that typosquatters are
continuously acquiring new typosquatting domains.
The solid line in the same figure shows the daily number of
active typosquatting domains serving malicious content. This
line does not follow the monotonic increase of the crossed-out
line, indicating that typosquatters are not only registering new
domains, but are also getting rid of domains at approximately
the same rate. On average, there are 10,510 active malicious
typosquatting domains per day, which amounts to 21 such
domains per authoritative domain. Apart from three signifi-
cant dips, which are discussed below, the number of active
malicious typosquatting domains remains fairly constant over
time.
As can be seen from the figure, the first dip in the number
of active malicious typosquatting domains took place from
June 4 to 6. Our data indicates this dip can be attributed to a
single large cluster of ad parking pages that contained signif-
icantly fewer domains during these days. This cluster, which
is the single largest cluster of our data set, has an average of
2,136 domains per day, but contained only 1,049 domains per
day during these three days. Furthermore, 97% of the domains
that dropped out during this period resolved to a single
subnet in the days before, namely 208.73.210.0/23, an IP
address block in an autonomous system owned by Oversee.net.
These results indicate that a single large ad parking hoster,
related to Oversee.net, for some reason blocked our crawlers
or was having network connectivity problems.
The second dip took place from August 21 to 25 and is
preceded by a more subtle reduction in the number of active
typosquatting domains in the weeks before. Our data shows
that 1,675 domains that were previously hosting ads started
serving blank pages or showed an error during this period (see
also Fig. 3). More than 90% of those domains were parked
with Sedo.5 The dip coincides with the period during which
our crawl rate was increased (see Section II-C), which leads
us to believe that some of Sedo’s ad parking servers blocked
our crawlers due to the increased traffic.
On October 18 and 20, the number of active malicious
typosquatting domains again drops by a significant amount.
Our data indicates this dip is again due to Sedo servers
5http://www.sedo.com/
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Fig. 2. The daily domain count shows an average of 10,500 active malicious
typosquatting domains per day and a steady increase in the total number of
discovered malicious typosquatting domains over time.
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Fig. 3. Apart from the three dips discussed in Section III-B, the category
distribution remains relatively constant over time.
temporarily returning blank pages or showing errors, although
we could not find any specific reason for these servers to block
our crawlers during these days.
C. Category Distribution
Fig. 3 shows how the collected typosquatting pages are
distributed over the categories listed in Table I. To improve
readability, some related or very small categories have been
grouped together and the legitimate pages have been excluded
from the graph. We can see that, apart from the dips dis-
cussed above, the distribution stays relatively constant over
time. Table II shows the overall distribution of the visited
typosquatting pages over all identified categories. Clearly, the
ad parking category is by far the largest, confirming the results
of Moore and Edelman [16]. The second largest category
consists of the pages showing no content, including completely
TABLE II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF TYPOSQUATTING PAGES OVER ALL
IDENTIFIED CATEGORIES. THE AUTHORITATIVE DOMAIN VISITS ARE
EXCLUDED FROM THESE NUMBERS.
Category Category
Ad parking 50.55% Scam 2.40%
No content 11.62% Adult 1.90%
Affiliate abuse 6.89% For sale 1.56%
Authoritative 5.37% Crawl error 0.99%
Hit stealing 4.90% Other 0.30%
Coinciding 4.88% Protected 0.29%
Server error 3.03% Unclassified 5.20%
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blank or black pages and pages that label themselves as under
construction. By manual analysis, we discovered that some of
the domains showing blank and black pages did show content
when visited through a foreign proxy server, indicating that
some typosquatters were using IP blacklists or geolocation
information to block our crawlers.
The affiliate abuse category is ranked third. During our
manual analysis, we discovered that many of the pages in this
category are using third-party services to hide the referring
URL when abusing an affiliate program. For instance the ty-
posquatting domain hostgatkr.com forwards its visitors to
tracking.warmmedia.com (with a parameter indicating
where to redirect to further on), which then redirects the visitor
to a URL within the hostgator.com domain, specifying an
affiliate id parameter. Because of the intermediate redirection,
the exploited site hostgator.com sees visitors coming
from warmmedia.com instead of hostgatkr.com. This
makes it much harder for HostGator to discover that they
are paying a commission for traffic that should have been
theirs in the first place. Other commonly used redirection
services we discovered are trafficinterface.com and
world-redirect.com.
Hit stealing is ranked fifth in Table II but is the third
largest malicious category. We discovered two distinct types
of domains in this category. The first type consists of do-
mains owned by a competitor of the authoritative site that
is being typosquatted. These domains typically just forward
their visitors to the competitor’s site, effectively stealing
the traffic of the authoritative domain. While we saw this
behavior mostly with adult sites, some non-adult sites are
stealing hits from their competitors as well. For instance, the
Russian search site tochki.ru has typosquatting sites reg-
istered for google.com.ua, google.ru, rambler.ru
and yandex.ru. The other type of hit stealing domains are
those owned by Internet marketing companies trying to draw
traffic to the sites of their customers. These domains typi-
cally forward their visitors to unrelated pages, often changing
the destination domain at regular time intervals or even on
every visit. For instance, over a dozen Czech typosquatting
domains of google.cz and seznam.cz were forwarding
their visitors to a different legitimate Czech domain on every
visit. Similarities in the way the forwarding is implemented on
these different typosquatting domains and in the parameters
specified in the destination URL, lead us to believe that all
of these domains are owned by a single Internet marketing
company that is using them to draw traffic to its customers.
This is of course a questionable way of increasing the traffic
to their customers’ websites, since the typosquatting domains
used for this purpose are typically unrelated to the various
landing pages, making it unlikely that a redirected visitor will
stay on the landing domain. As such, while the landing page
will likely receive hundreds or thousands of extra visitors, it
is doubtful that these visitors will be of value. One could
argue that these companies are providing “typosquatting-as-
a-service” rather than proper Internet marketing services.
D. Typosquatting Models
To investigate to what degree typosquatters and legitimate
domain owners are aware of the different models that can
be used to generate typosquatting domains, we calculated the
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Fig. 4. The typosquatting saturation per typosquatting model. Although the
substitution model has the most domains in absolute numbers, it is the least
popular taking into account the number of domains generated by each model.
number of registered domains for each of the five models
described in Section II-A. Our data indicates there are 6,399
malicious and 376 defensive registrations for domains gener-
ated by the character substitution model, making it the most
popular model in absolute numbers. This is to be expected
however, because the character substitution model generates
much more typosquatting domains for a given authoritative
domain than any other model. Conversely, the missing dot
model only generates a single possible typosquatting domain
per authoritative domain. To accurately compare the popularity
of the different typosquatting models, we should hence look at
the active fraction of all possible typosquatting domains, per
typosquatting model. That is, out of all typosquatting domains
generated according to some model (starting from our list of
authoritative domains), we look at how many of them are active
(i.e., resolve to a web page). We call this relative measure
the typosquatting saturation per typosquatting model. Fig. 4
shows the typosquatting saturation for each of the five models
we consider, differentiating between defensive and malicious
registrations. We can see that, by this measure, the character
substitution model is actually the least popular model, i.e., out
of all possible typosquatting domains generated by this model,
less than 40% are in use. The figure shows that the missing
dot model is the most popular model, for defensive as well as
for malicious registrations. Our data indicates no significant
change in the popularity of the different models over time.
Note that if we would rank the five models based on
their corresponding typosquatting saturation, we get the same
ranking whether we consider malicious or defensive registra-
tions. This suggests that attackers and defenders have a similar
perception of what typosquatting domains are worthwhile to
register.
E. Influence of Domain Name Length
Since four of the five typosquatting models we consider
can be applied for each character in a domain name, the
number of possible typosquatting domains for a given au-
thoritative domain increases linearly with the length of the
authoritative domain. Previous work published by Banerjee
et al. [2] indicated that the active number of typosquatting
domains for a given authoritative domain does not follow this
relation: shorter domains were targeted much more frequently
than longer domains. Our data shows that this is no longer the
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Fig. 5. Domains with short names suffer more from typosquatting, but this
effect is not nearly as outspoken as in the ’08 results of Banerjee et al. [2].
case, as illustrated by Fig. 5. The solid black bars in this figure
show the average typosquatting saturation per authoritative
domain name length when taking all five typosquatting models
into account. That is, the Y-axis shows the percentage of
all possible typosquatting domains of authoritative domains
of a certain length that are active (i.e., resolve to an IP
address hosting a website). As mentioned in Section III-D,
the typosquatting saturation is an averaging over time and in
this case takes into account the fact that longer authoritative
domains have more possible typosquatting domains. Although
the solid bars show a decrease in typosquatting saturation as
the authoritative domain length increases, this decrease is not
nearly as outspoken as in the results of Banerjee et al. in
2008 [2], where the typosquatting saturation quickly drops to
under 20% for domains longer than 5 characters.
Furthermore, since the number of possible typosquatting
domains following the character substitution model rises very
quickly as the domain length increases, and the previous
section has shown that this is the least popular typosquat-
ting model, we can automatically expect the typosquatting
saturation to drop with increasing domain length. To remove
this bias, the crossed-out bars in Fig. 5 discard the character
substitution model. Here we can see even more clearly that
there is no correlation between typosquatting saturation and
authoritative domain length for the domains we investigated.
These results indicate that typosquatters have started target-
ing longer authoritative domains in the past six years. The most
likely reason for this is that most short typosquatting domains
were already in use: the figure illustrates that the average
typosquatting saturation for domain names up to 8 characters
is over 75%. A large fraction of the possible typosquatting
domains of relatively short, popular websites is hence already
registered.
F. Influence of Alexa Rank
Since typosquatters are trying to get as many page hits as
possible, more popular authoritative domains are presumably
targeted more often than less popular domains. Fig. 6 shows
a box-and-whisker plot indicating the typosquatting saturation
per Alexa rank. The ends of the whiskers show the minimum
and maximum typosquatting saturation, the box shows the
upper and lower quartiles and the line within the box shows
the median typosquatting saturation. The plot indicates that
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saturation.
the saturation within each rank bin varies widely and shows
no significant correlation between rank and saturation. This
contradicts the ’08 results of Banerjee et al. [2], which in-
dicated that the percentage of active typosquatting domains
for a given authoritative domain reduces significantly with
decreasing popularity, reaching only about 20% for the domain
ranking 500 in their list of authoritative domains. Our results
hence indicate typosquatters have started focusing on lower
ranking domains in the past six years, in addition to the
top ranking domains. These results are consistent with the
recent findings of Szurdi et al. [23], who investigated the
typosquatting activity for all .com domains in the Alexa
top 1 million. Their study indicates that, although there is
a positive correlation between typosquatting saturation and
authoritative domain popularity, the typosquatting saturation
is still at 40% near the Alexa 1 million rank.
To further investigate the influence of authoritative domain
popularity on typosquatting activity, we investigated whether
there is a correlation between the change in Alexa rank of an
authoritative domain over our data gathering period, and the
change in number of active malicious typosquatting domains
of that authoritative domain. We did this by comparing the
authoritative domain ranks and the number of active malicious
typosquatting domains during the first week our data gathering
period with the same figures during the last week of data
gathering period, but we found no significant correlation.
G. Typosquatting Domain Volatility
One of the main objectives of our longitudinal study is
to evaluate the volatility of the field of typosquatting. In
particular, we would like to see (1) whether domains are
changing hands from typosquatters to legitimate owners and
(2) whether typosquatters vary the type of content they host
on their domains. For this, we look at the number of category
transitions per domain. To avoid overestimating the number of
transitions, we assume that the content hosted on a domain
does not change when we see a transition from a legitimate
or malicious category to an undetermined category. That is,
suppose a domain is in a legitimate or malicious category C
at date x and is in an undetermined category at date x+1, then
we still consider the domain to be in category C at date x+1.
We used this methodology to generate the graph in Fig. 7,
which hence gives a lower bound on the number of category
transitions per domain over time.
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Fig. 8. Frequency distribution of the number of malicious category transitions
per domain. Note that the Y-axis has a logarithmic scale.
The two bottom lines of this figure refer to the left-
hand Y-scale and show the total number of malicious to
legitimate or legitimate to malicious transitions. During our
study, we saw an average of about 3 malicious-to-legitimate,
and about 2 legitimate-to-malicious transitions per week.
These numbers indicate legitimate owners are taking over
domains from typosquatters and vice versa, albeit not in great
numbers. With the exception of one domain, all domains
that moved from malicious to legitimate stayed legitimate
until the end of the data gathering period, and likewise for
the legitimate to malicious transitions. The one exception
is os.com, a domain being leased by lexidot.com and
which transitioned from the “Coinciding” category to the
“For sale” category and back, twice during the data gathering
period. Some examples of malicious to legitimate transitions
are tumblr.com taking over timblr.com, umblr.com
and six other typosquatting domains. Some examples of
transitions in the other direction are livedoor.com los-
ing livedooor.com and bleacherreport.com losing
bleachereport.com. For some of these legitimate to
malicious transitions, the WHOIS records clearly indicate a
change of hands, while for others the records are incomplete or
simply do not change, which could indicate that those domains
were already owned by typosquatters but were not being used
for malicious purposes initially.
The upper line of Fig. 7 uses the right-hand Y-scale and
shows the number of malicious category transitions, e.g., a
transition from the “Ad Parking” category to the “Affiliate
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Fig. 9. Cumulative distribution function of the number of /24 subnets per
domain. Malicious domains are more likely to resolve to multiple subnets over
time than legitimate domains.
abuse” category. With an average of 1,239 transitions per
week, we can see that these kinds of transitions occur much
more frequently than legit-malicious transitions. If we average
the total number of category transitions over the number of
discovered typosquatting domains, we get a value of 2.84
transitions per domain over the seven month data gathering
period. This means that, on average, a typosquatting domain
serves pages from the same category for about 75 days in
a row. However, in practice most domains did not change
category at all during the data gathering period, while some
changed very often. The bar chart in Fig. 8 shows the frequency
distribution of the number of malicious category transitions per
domain. The data indicates that 8,521 domains, representing
65% of all malicious typosquatting domains, stayed in the
same category for the entire duration of the study, and 95%
of all malicious typosquatting domains made less than 20
category changes. Nevertheless, there are some domains that
switch malicious categories up to 79 times.
By manual inspection, we saw some typosquatting domains
redirect to a different landing page on a regular basis, some-
times even on every visit. We posit that the domains operating
in this fashion can be subdivided into two types. The first type
of domains shows different categories of landing pages, often
switching between ad parking, affiliate abuse and scamming
pages. Typosquatters most likely use this scheme to diversify
their monetization strategy, possibly even switching to the most
profitable strategy dynamically. An example of a typosquatting
domain of this type is yuotube.com, a domain that, at the
time of writing, switches between pages classified under the
ad parking, affiliate abuse and scam categories on every visit.
The other type of domains shows many different pages over
time, but all within the general hit stealing category. These
domains are owned by the rogue Internet marketing company
for drawing traffic to the sites of its customers, as discussed
in Section III-C.
H. IP Address Statistics
In the previous section we found some typosquatting do-
mains to be very volatile, i.e., changing typosquatting cate-
gories many times during the data gathering period. To see
whether the IP address these domains resolve to also changes
regularly, we investigated the number of distinct IP addresses
and subnets associated with each typosquatting domain over
time. Fig. 9 shows the cumulative density function of the num-
ber of distinct /24 subnets per domain, for both the legitimate
domains and the malicious domains. We considered a domain
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TABLE III. IP SUBNETS AND CORRESPONDING AUTONOMOUS
SYSTEMS (AS) SERVING THE MOST MALICIOUS TYPOSQUATTING PAGES
AND DOMAINS. TOGETHER THESE NETWORKS ACCOUNT FOR 36% OF ALL
MALICIOUS PAGES AND 50% OF ALL MALICIOUS DOMAINS VISITED.
Network AS owner Nb visits Nb domains
208.73.210.0/23 Oversee.net 259,781 2,405
199.59.243.96/28 Bodis 209,388 1,741
82.98.86.160/27 Sedo 187,174 1,388
69.43.161.128/25 Castle Access 140,098 1,216
to be legitimate when it is classified as such for at least 90% of
the data gathering period, and we again considered a domain
to be malicious when it is classified as malicious for at least
7 days. We only take into account the 24 most significant bits
of an IP address to group together addresses that are close to
each other, for instance belonging to servers in the same data
center. Changing the subnet mask by a couple of bits has no
significant influence on the graph. We can see from the graph
that malicious domains are much more likely to resolve to
more than one subnet over time than legitimate domains. For
up to 90% of all domains, malicious domains resolve to more
distinct subnets over time than legitimate domains.
Conversely, we can also look at the number of malicious
typosquatting domains per IP subnet. The 13,526 malicious
typosquatting domains discovered during our study resolve
to only 2,377 distinct IP addresses, which means that on
average each of them hosts 5.7 typosquatting domains. In
practice, however, a much smaller range of IP addresses hosts
a very large fraction of the typosquatting pages: the four
subnets shown in Table III together host 36% of all malicious
typosquatting pages and 50% of all malicious typosquatting
domains visited during the study. The table also shows the
owner of the autonomous system corresponding to each net-
work. Except for Castle Access, which operates enterprise data
centers, each of these companies is in the domain parking
business.
I. Registrar statistics
Based on our collected WHOIS records, we investigated
the most commonly used registrars for both legitimate and
malicious domain registrations. Ranking the registrars by their
number of malicious typosquatting domain registrations shows,
unsurprisingly, that the overall most popular registrars also
have the most malicious domain registrations. Unfortunately,
we do not know the total number of domain registrations for
each of the encountered registrars, nor have we investigated
enough domains to make statistically significant claims about
whether or not particular registrars are used more often than
others for malicious registrations.
Nonetheless, our data does show that some registrars have
a significantly higher ratio of legitimate to malicious registra-
tions than others. These are mostly reputable registrars that
explicitly market themselves as brand protection or corporate
domain portfolio management companies, such as Safenames
and Corporation Service Company (CSC). However, we also
found the company Network Solutions to have a high ratio
of legitimate to malicious domains in our study, even though
we could not find any evidence that this company has a better
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Fig. 10. The typosquatting saturation per authoritative domain category. Adult
typosquatting domains are clearly targeting adult authoritative sites more than
other authoritative sites.
than average reputation6, nor that it positions itself as a brand
protection specialist. We suspect many legitimate domains are
registered through this company because of its historic role,
first as registry for the .com, .org and .net zones and later
as the sole domain registrar for these TLDs, until ’98. Our data
indeed indicates that their legitimate domains are mostly high-
profile domains with a length of 2 to 5 characters, registered
in the 1990’s.
We posit that the reason for these results is that the total
set of typosquatting domains for any given authoritative site is
spread among many typosquatters, a claim which is supported
by our WHOIS data. Since each typosquatter can opt for
a different registrar, there is a dilution of malicious activity
over the most popular registrars. On the other hand, when
a legitimate company uses a brand protection service, all
defensive domain registrations are likely to be done through
the same registrar. As such, the legitimate registrations will
tend to cluster, while the malicious registrations will tend to
get diffused.
J. Influence of Authoritative Domain Type
To see whether typosquatters indiscriminately target all
popular domains, or rather target certain kinds of author-
itative domains more often than others, we classified our
list of authoritative domains into content-based categories.
This classification was done manually, with the assistance
of Trend Micro’s Site Safety Center7 and McAfee’s Threat
Intelligence8 domain categorization services. Fig. 10 shows the
typosquatting saturation for these authoritative categories and
also illustrates the relative contribution of the most important
malicious typosquatting categories to the saturation. Since
our data indicates no significant change of the typosquatting
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network Solutions#Controversies
7http://global.sitesafety.trendmicro.com/
8http://www.mcafee.com/threat-intelligence/domain/
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saturation per authoritative domain category in time, we show
an averaging over time. In order for the results to be represen-
tative, authoritative categories containing less than 10 domains
have been excluded.
We can see from the figure that adult sites are targeted
the most and that adult typosquatting domains are clearly
targeting adult authoritative domains more often than other
types of authoritative domains. The social networking cat-
egory comes second and also experiences some adult ty-
posquatting, caused mainly by the typosquatting domains of
odnoklassniki.ru and renren.com. There are also
substantial differences in the contribution of the affiliate abuse
or scam typosquatting domains between the different authorita-
tive categories. It would be wrong to attribute these differences
to the fact that some authoritative categories (e.g. marketplace
and shopping) are more likely to offer an affiliate program
than others, because a typosquatting site in the affiliate abuse
category does not necessarily exploit an affiliate program of
its own authoritative site. In fact, we saw many cases of
typosquatting domains exploiting an affiliate program of an
unrelated domain during our manual classification. Hence,
we cannot pinpoint a specific reason for this difference in
the contribution of the affiliate abuse or scam typosquatting
domains between the different authoritative categories based
on our data.
K. Influence of TLD
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) is responsible for coordinating the global do-
main name system, but has delegated the responsibility of
managing top-level domains to other commercial or non-
profit organizations, known as registry operators. This is true
for generic TLDs (.com, .org, .net, etc.) as well as for
country-code TLDs (.de, .jp, etc.). These registry operators
may also fulfill the role of registrar, or may delegate this
responsibility to other companies. A registrar must be officially
accredited by ICANN for it to directly do business with a
registry operator, while non-ICANN-accredited registrars can
only be resellers for other registrars. For the generic TLDs, all
accredited registrars have adopted the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) [14]. This is a policy to
be agreed between a registrar and a registrant for a domain
name registration, giving an official domain dispute panel the
right to take down or transfer ownership of the domain in case
a third party complainant can prove the registration violates
her rights. The goal of this policy is to reduce the prevalence
of cybersquatting by saving the complainant from having to
start an expensive court procedure in order to take down the
domain.
While this policy is being applied for all generic TLDs,
not all country-code TLDs follow the same approach. Some
country-code TLD registry operators that do not implement
the UDRP have decided to implement their own similar out-
of-court domain dispute resolution, but others only intervene
in disputed registrations after an official court ruling. This can
potentially have an influence on the prevalence of typosquat-
ting in those TLDs. In particular, we can expect that TLDs
providing a swift, out-of-court procedure for domain disputes
have fewer typosquatting domains than those that do not.
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Fig. 11. The typosquatting saturation per TLD, for those TLDs with at least 5
domains in our top 500 list. The different patterns indicate the type of dispute
arbitration provided.
A second way in which local domain authorities have an
influence on the prevalence of typosquatting, is in their price
setting. Obviously typosquatting can only be profitable if the
revenue from a domain name is greater than its cost. Hence, we
can expect more expensive TLDs to attract less typosquatters
than cheaper TLDs.
A final policy component that can have an effect on
typosquatting, is the restrictions placed by registry operators
on registrants that can apply for a domain name. For instance,
some country-code registry operators require registrants to be
a citizen of the corresponding country or to have a local
correspondence address. This makes it more difficult (and
hence more expensive) or even impossible for foreign parties
to legally register a domain name under those TLDs, hence
potentially lowering their attractiveness for typosquatters.
Fig. 11 shows the typosquatting saturation per TLD, for
the TLDs with at least 5 domains in our top 500 list. The
typosquatting saturation per TLD does not change significantly
over time, hence we show an averaging over time. The different
bar patterns in the figure indicate the type of dispute arbitration
provided by the corresponding TLD authority. “Court” means
the authority provides no out-of-court arbitration whatsoever,
“UDRP” means the authority has adopted the UDRP and
“Custom” means the authority implements some custom form
of out-of-court arbitration. We can see that the two TLDs
without an out-of-court arbitration option have the highest
typosquatting saturation.
On the other side of the scale, the Brazilian TLD and espe-
cially the Japanese TLD have a significantly lower typosquat-
ting saturation. Since we did not find any evidence to indicate
that domain names under these TLDs are particularly difficult
to obtain, we believe the scarcity of typosquatting domains for
these TLDs can be attributed to the high cost of acquiring such
domains. We calculated the yearly price of a domain under
these TLDs by averaging the yearly price advertised by the
global top 3 domain registrars9 GoDaddy, eNom and Network
Solutions, and found that a .com.br domain costs $43 and a
.jp domain costs $107, while domains under all other TLDs
shown in Fig. 11 sell for less than $15. Clearly, these higher
domain prices are effective at deterring typosquatters. Based
on the steep drop in typosquatting saturation between the .br
and .jp domains, we can estimate the annual revenue of a
typosquatting domain of a popular website to be somewhere
between $43 and $107. However, since there are still plenty
9According to http://www.webhosting.info/registrars/top-registrars/global/
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of domains available under cheap TLDs, there is also no real
incentive for typosquatters to target the more expensive TLDs,
hence the annual revenue might actually be higher.
IV. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first content-
based study that examines the problem of typosquatting in
time. Prior work on typosquatting almost always operated by
taking a snapshot of the typosquatting problem and charac-
terizing that snapshot, or by limiting the longitudinal aspect
of the study to domain registration records only. Our work is
complementary to this type of prior work because it adds to the
understanding of typosquatting abuse and reveals trends that
otherwise remain hidden. In this section we review prior work
on typosquatting as well as other types of domain squatting
attacks.
Cybersquatting: Cybersquatting refers to the registration
of domains that include trademarks belonging to other per-
sons and companies. Cybersquatting was popular in the early
nineties, when long-existing brick-and-mortar companies did
not yet operate websites. Various opportunists registered their
trademarks as domain names before them, so that they would
sell the domains back to their rightful owners for profit [11].
Today, this type of domain squatting is not as popular,
since companies usually register all appropriate domains well
before the company and its trademarks become popular. There
are, however, still cases where opportunists try to speculate
the name of future products and services and register them,
before the company marketing the product or service gets a
chance to.10 This phenomenon has been studied by Coull et
al. [5] together with other domain registration abuses, such as
domain-name front running.
Typosquatting: Cybersquatting evolved into typosquatting,
i.e., the act of registering domains that are mistypes of popular
authoritative domains, with the intention of capturing the traffic
of users who mistype URLs in their browser address bar. This
practice can be traced back to over 15 years, since the 1999
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) already
mentioned URLs that are “sufficiently similar to a trademark
of a person or entity” [1].
Edelman, in 2003, reported on thousands of mistyped and
cybersquatting domains that served sexually-explicit content,
which were likely registered by the same individual [8].
Wang et al. [25] later described a system for automatically
discovering and analyzing typosquatting by simulating typing
errors. The researchers also brought attention to the fact that
the majority of the discovered typosquatting domains were
pointing to companies specializing in domain parking, which
were used to automatically serve ads related to the mistyped
domain name. In this paper, we used Wang et al.’s models
to generate typosquatting domains for our seven-month long
study.
Banerjee et al. [2] showed that typosquatting extends
beyond the models of Wang et al., including the abuse of
domain suffixes, such as typosquatting .org domains, for the
equivalent .com authoritative ones. Even though the authors
have collected typosquatting data over a two-month period,
10Parked domain with ads - www.iphone9.com
they do not perform a longitudinal study and thus do not
include the parameter of time in their reported results.
Halvorson et al. [12] recently showed that over three
quarters of the domains registered with the .xxx TLD are
defensive registrations where companies and individuals pre-
emptively register their trademarks with the .xxx extension,
e.g., obama.xxx and president.xxx, out of fear that
someone could, in the future, use these domains to harm their
image.
Moore and Edelman performed a similar study for discov-
ering typosquatting domains in 2010 [16] and estimated that
approximately one million typosquatting domains targeted the
top 3,264 .com sites. The authors also bring attention to the
fact that large advertising networks willingly cooperate with ty-
posquatters by showing ads on the mistyped domains. As such,
these networks can be held equally responsible for the damage
against the authoritative domains that are being attacked. Next
to the use of ads as a monetization strategy, there have also
been documented cases of typosquatting domains used to serve
malware [9]. Nikiforakis et al. [20] showed that typosquatting
can also occur outside the confines of a browser’s address bar,
in remote JavaScript inclusions. There, developers mistype the
domains of remote code providers and thus make their sites
susceptible to malicious script injections served through the
appropriate mistyped domains.
Szurdi et al. [23] recently investigated typosquatting regis-
trations targeting .com domains that are in the “long tail” of
the popularity distribution. The authors present a tool named
Yet Another Typosquatting Tool (YATT), which uses passive
domain features and (optionally) active domain features such
as DNS, WHOIS and content information, to identify and
categorize typosquatting domains into categories similar to
ours. The authors use this tool to classify 4.7 million potential
typosquatting .com domains derived from the Alexa top 1 mil-
lion. Their results indicate that, although the typosquatting
saturation decreases for less popular authoritative domains, it
is still at 40% near the Alexa 1 million rank and an estimated
20% of all .com domains appear to be typosquatting domains.
The study also includes a longitudinal component, tracking the
domain registrations between October 2012 and October 2013
based on daily dumps of the .com zone file. In contrast to our
study, the content of these domains is not taken into account for
the longitudinal analysis. That is, when a new domain appears
in the zone file, it is compared against the list of all potential
typosquatting domains generated from the Alexa 1 million, to
determine whether or not it is an active typosquatting domain.
The authors find, amongst other results, that typosquatting
domains of popular authoritative domains appear to change
hands much more frequently than other domains.
Finally, Vissers et al. [24] very recently performed a study
which explored the ecosystem of domain parking services.
While these services have previously been investigated in the
context of cybersquatting, this study explores the domain park-
ing ecosystem in its own right. The authors discover, among
other results, that between 1.63% and 9% of the investigated
parking domains are typosquatting domains. The study also
shows that some of the investigated parking service providers
have a significantly higher ratio of typosquatting domains
than others, with only one provider serving no typosquatting
domains at all.
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Homograph attacks: In domain-homograph attacks, attack-
ers take advantage of the perceived visual similarity between
two or more letters, in order to trick the user into believing that
she is interacting with a specific authoritative website while
she is interacting with a malicious one. This confusion can be
abused to convince users to willingly submit their credentials
and other sensitive information. The main difference between
these attacks and the previously mentioned domain squatting
attacks, is that the homograph domains are usually spread-out
through spam emails and social networks, instead of relying
on user mistakes, since their construction cannot usually be
achieved through typical typing mistakes.
Gabrilovich and Gontmakher showed that characters from
non-Latin character-sets that look like Latin characters can
be substituted to confuse the user of the nature of a
given domain [10]. For instance, an attacker could register
paypal.com using the Cyrillic letter P (lower case “r”,
Unicode U+0440), which looks almost identical to the Latin
letter “p”. Today, this type of attack is significantly harder since
browser vendors revert to the punycode format of URLs [4],
whenever they think that a domain is maliciously crafted.
Dhamija et al. [6], investigate why phishing works, and
mention “visually deceptive text”, i.e., domains that substitute
characters with look-alikes within the same character-set, such
as bankofvvest.com (two “v”s instead of a “w”). Hol-
gers et al. [13] performed a large-scale study of homograph
attacks by gathering popular domains and searching for their
homographed versions. Their results showed that, even though
the monetization strategies of homograph domains are very
similar to traditional domain squatting, the practice of regis-
tering homograph domains is significantly less popular than
typosquatting.
Other types of domain squatting: In 2011, Dinaburg
proposed a new type of domain squatting, bitsquatting [7].
Dinaburg hypothesized that random bit-flips that occur in
hardware memory that is failing or operating outside normal
temperatures, can be abused for domain squatting purposes,
assuming that the flips would occur in the bits holding the
textual representation of a domain name. Domain squatters can
register domains that have a one-bit difference from popular
authoritative domains and capture the traffic resulting from
such erroneous bit-flips. Dinaburg registered 30 bitsquatting
domains, such as mic2osoft.com, and recorded more than
50,000 requests over an eight-month period. Later research
showed that domain squatters have already adopted this tech-
nique [18]. Recently, Nikiforakis et al. also discovered that
domain squatters, next to typos, are also abusing the sound
similarity of words to construct malicious squatting domains
and attract users to them [19].
V. CONCLUSION
Typosquatting has been known and studied for over 15
years, yet we have shown that it remains a popular form of
domain abuse up until this day. By performing the first content-
based longitudinal study of typosquatting abuse, we have
investigated to what extent previously discovered typosquatting
trends still hold today, and have also discovered many new
typosquatting facts. Our main results include that (1) few
trademark owners protect themselves against typosquatting by
defensively registering typosquatting domains for their own do-
mains, (2) over 75% of all possible typosquatting domains for
short popular authoritative domains are already registered, and
that typosquatters are increasingly targeting longer domains,
(3) typosquatters are varying their monetization strategy over
time, (4) some companies choose not to renew their defensive
registrations of typosquatting domains, leading these domains
back into the eager hands of typosquatters, (5) up to 50%
of all typosquatting domains can be traced back to just four
typosquatting page hosters and (6) certain top-level domains
are much less prone to typosquatting than others, due to their
price setting and local registration and arbitration policies. We
hope this paper and the corresponding dataset, which has been
made publicly available online, can serve as a new reference
for the state of the typosquatting landscape.
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